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Abstract: The legitimacy of the electoral process is crucial for the consolidation of democracy. 
We here focus on individual perceptions of electoral integrity (IPEI) and seek to understand 
what factors can explain different degrees of IPEI. In particular, we use the sixth wave of the 
World Values Survey (2010–2014) to examine how anti-authoritarian values affect individu-
als’ directional bias, driven by political party support, in evaluating electoral integrity. The 
results show that IPEI do depend on an interaction of political party support and the strength 
of anti-authoritarian values. However, the addition of the latter does not lead to a convergence 
of integrity evaluations among winners and losers, as may be expected under the assumption 
that anti-authoritarian values drive voters to more carefully monitor and evaluate the electoral 
process. Instead, it leads to greater polarization between electoral winners and losers. We ex-
plain the result with reference to the motivated reasoning literature on biased information pro-
cessing: while anti-authoritarian convictions lead people to obtain more information on the 
electoral process, their political leanings bias their reading of this information, which in effect 
leads to stronger polarization in perceptions. 
Keywords: elections; party support; political values; motivated reasoning; World Values Sur-
vey 
 
Acknowledgments: We thank the Electoral Integrity Project for making data on the topic avail-
able and for giving the first author the opportunity to work on this paper during a research stay 
at the University of Sydney in 2016. We further thank the project members as well as the anon-
ymous referees for their helpful comments.  
2 
Party support, values, and perceptions of electoral integrity 
The legitimacy of the electoral process is crucial for the consolidation of democracy. Citizens 
who doubt the freeness and fairness of elections show lower levels of political support (Norris, 
2014), are less likely to turn out to vote (Birch, 2010; Carreras & Irepoglu, 2013), and more 
likely to participate in protests or even electoral violence (Norris, Frank & Martínez i Coma, 
2015). But research on which factors affect citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity has only 
emerged recently, and this research has mainly focused on contextual determinants such as the 
conduct of institutions and the quality of democracy more generally (e.g. Birch, 2008; Kerr, 
2013; Norris, 2014; Rosas, 2010).  
In contrast, little attention has been paid to individual-level determinants, beyond their inclu-
sion as control variables. Besides socio-demographic background, such control variables in-
variably include political partisanship. And here, the reported results show a remarkably robust 
effect on perceptions of electoral integrity: supporters of governing parties evaluate electoral 
integrity to be significantly higher than supporters of the opposition. Illustrative here are the 
Austrian presidential elections held in May 2016, whose “losers” questioned the legitimacy of 
the process, or the British EU Referendum of June 2016, in whose wake the “winners” voiced 
concern that the losers are not going to acknowledge the validity and legitimacy of the vote. 
This paper examines the winner–loser gap in more detail. Going beyond the “sore loser” hy-
pothesis usually advanced to explain the gap, we examine the effect of both political leanings 
and anti-authoritarian values: individuals who are more invested in the electoral process – 
whether electoral losers or winners – likely evaluate its integrity differently than those who do 
not champion democracy over authoritarian forms of government. We show that perceptions 
of electoral integrity in fact depend on an interaction between party support and the strength of 
anti-authoritarian values. However, the addition of the latter does not lead to a convergence of 
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integrity evaluations among winners and losers, as may have been expected, but to greater 
polarization. We explain this result with reference to the motivated reasoning literature on bi-
ased information processing: while anti-authoritarian convictions motivate people to obtain 
more information on the electoral process, their political leanings bias their reading of this 
information, which in effect leads to stronger polarization in perceptions. We demonstrate the 
interaction effect with data from the sixth wave of World Values Survey (2010–2014), covering 
41,395 respondents in 29 diverse electoral democracies.  
Psychological explanations for the winner–loser gap  
The winner–loser gap in perceptions of electoral integrity is remarkably robust: losers consist-
ently evaluate electoral integrity more negatively than winners in Africa (Kerr, 2013; Moehler, 
2009), Asia (Cho & Kim, 2015), Eastern Europe (McAllister & White, 2015; Rose & Mishler, 
2009), Latin America (Cantú & García-Ponce, 2015), North America (Bowler, Brunell, Do-
novan & Gronke, 2015; Sances & Stewart III, 2015), as well as across continents (Anderson, 
Blais, Bowler, Donovan & Listhaug, 2005; Birch, 2008; Norris, 2014). However, as most stud-
ies do not focus on the winner–loser gap per se – with partisanship in fact acting mostly as 
control variable – the theoretical background is often only discussed in passing.  
Explanations for the winner–loser gap in perceptions of electoral integrity lean on those for the 
winner–loser gap in other measures of political support, such as evaluations of government 
performance or satisfaction with democratic performance. Some studies suggest that electoral 
losers are more likely to be critical of the government – and hence of the electoral procedure – 
because, in contrast to winners, they are less likely to excuse imperfections (Moehler, 2009). 
Losers’ evaluations are hence more likely to accurately reflect the fairness of the electoral pro-
cess, and the gap mainly arises because winners are not critical enough. Most frequently, how-
ever, reference is made to the “sore loser effect” outlined by Anderson et al. (2005), which 
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argues that electoral losers are dissatisfied with the election results and hence see the political 
system generally in a worse light than electoral winners do. If perceptions of electoral integrity 
are seen as another measure of political support (but see Atkeson, Alvarez & Hall, 2015) it is 
the frustrated losers who evaluate the process worse than they otherwise would and hence those 
who are driving the gap.1  
Taking a cognitive approach, the gap may be explained with motivated reasoning. Motivated 
reasoning describes how goals or motivations affect the way information is being processed: 
different goals manifest in different information-processing strategies to obtain the goals, in-
cluding strategies of accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs (Kunda, 1990; for a recent 
review, see Leeper & Slothuus, 2014). Most relevant to the winner–loser gap are directional 
goals. In reasoning motivated by directional goals, individuals feel the need to accept infor-
mation that confirms (confirmation bias) and to reject information that disconfirms (disconfir-
mation bias) their prior beliefs and actions. Information processing driven by directional goals 
is biased in at least three ways (see also Lebo & Cassino, 2007): individuals selectively expose 
themselves to confirming information, for example through partisan media; they question the 
accuracy or downplay the importance of dissonant but not of consonant information; or they 
reinterpret dissonant information to align with their prior attitudes. For example, in Taber and 
Lodge’s (2006) experiment, participants seek out confirmatory evidence when free to select 
information sources, uncritically accept arguments supporting their prior beliefs, and counter-
argue arguments that contradict them. Lebo and Cassino (2007), too, show that partisan groups 
selectively discount or consider information when asked for presidential approval ratings, and 
Rudolph and Popp (2007) demonstrate that respondents motivated by directional goals are least 
                                                 
1 Although one may also argue that euphoric winners also evaluate the process better than they otherwise would. 
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ambivalent in forming opinions. Directly focusing on the fairness of procedures, Doherty and 
Wolak (2012) show that student participants in their experiment are more likely to perceive 
decision-making procedures to be fair when they agree with the outcome than when they disa-
gree. Translated to perceptions of electoral integrity, both winners and losers differ from the 
perceptions they would have held in the absence of political leanings. 
Another important goal examined in motivational reasoning, however, has so far not been dis-
cussed in relation to the winner–loser gap, although they have been repeatedly found to mitigate 
the effect of directional goals: accuracy goals (see Kunda, 1990). Accuracy goals describe the 
need to reach a correct conclusion, which motivates individuals to seek out and carefully con-
sider relevant evidence. As they evaluate different sources of information that both confirm 
and disconfirm their prior directional beliefs, they invest more cognitive effort into the reason-
ing process. But what drives accuracy goals in evaluations of electoral processes? Prior re-
search on political attitudes has looked at personal dispositions to accuracy such as conscien-
tiousness (e.g. Nir, 2011) or political knowledge (e.g. Kam, 2005; Taber & Lodge, 2006). We 
examine instead whether and to what extent anti-authoritarian values moderate directional rea-
soning when it comes to electoral integrity. In particular, we would expect that respondents 
with strong anti-authoritarian values should care more about electoral integrity: respondents’ 
rejection of governments that have not been democratically elected implies that they care about 
democracy and, with it, its mainstay of fair elections. Hence, those who oppose authoritarian 
regimes should be more likely to carefully monitor and evaluate the electoral process. This 
hypothesis is supported by psychological research which shows that an issue is perceived to be 
personally important (attitude involvement) if it is linked to relevant values (value relevance) 
(Boninger, Krosnick & Berent, 1995; Thomsen, Borgida & Lavine, 1995). Attitude involve-
ment, in turn, increases one’s motivation to arrive at accurate evaluations: highly involved re-
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spondents process information more carefully and objectively, even in the presence of compet-
ing directional goals (Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). That is, we 
would expect that respondents with strong anti-authoritarian values should be less influenced 
by their political leanings and hence more accurate in evaluating the integrity of elections. 
However, in this paper we demonstrate that rather than mitigating directional goals, holding 
anti-authoritarian values exacerbates them: among those with strong anti-authoritarian values, 
the difference in perceptions of electoral integrity between winners and losers is even larger 
than among those with weaker anti-authoritarian values. We explain this with the cognitive-
motivational model of political information processing advanced by Lavine et al. (2000). While 
this model, too, holds that value relevance increases attitude involvement, it goes on to argue 
that involvement indeed diminishes the motivation to arrive at accurate conclusions. According 
to the model, value-relevant attitudes crystallize and strengthen, and over time become associ-
ated with issue-relevant knowledge. Information seeking shifts from being relatively objective 
to being biased towards information that supports people’s prior attitudes, in this case party 
support. That is, the three selective information-seeking strategies described with regard to 
directional goals above – selective exposure, selective judgment, and selective perception – 
also pertain to accuracy goals where the latter is affected by value-driven attitude involvement. 
Underlying values ensure that biased issue-relevant knowledge is more accessible, heightening 
directional reasoning. The model is consistent with psychological research showing that in-
volvement produces both biased information processing (Howard-Pitney, Borgida & Omoto, 
1986) as well as resistance to change (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996). Figure 1 illustrates the se-
quential process described in both hypotheses. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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To summarize, we can formulate three hypotheses on the link between party support, values, 
and perceptions of electoral integrity. Figure 2 illustrates the observable implications of these 
hypotheses with the expected marginal effect of winning or losing on perceptions of electoral 
integrity: a zero denotes that winners and losers should not differ significantly in their percep-
tions, that is, there should be no gap. A plus denotes that the respective group should perceive 
electoral integrity to be significantly better and a minus significantly worse than the other; that 
is, there should be a gap.  
First, the sore loser hypothesis common in the political science literature considers the effect 
of party support only, ignoring any effect of underlying values. According to this hypothesis, 
directional goals drive perceptions of electoral integrity such that people process information 
selectively to align with their political preferences: winners perceive electoral integrity to be 
better than they otherwise would (in Figure 2, +) while losers perceive it to be worse (-).  
The other two hypotheses both take values into account but arrive at opposite conclusions. Both 
agree that value relevance increases attitude involvement. The accuracy hypothesis goes on to 
argue that attitude involvement leads to more accurate information processing, such that people 
who care about the electoral process as indicated by their anti-authoritarian values converge in 
their assessment of electoral integrity, no matter their political preferences (in Figure 2, zero). 
The directional goals of those who do not care about the electoral process, however, are not 
mitigated, leading to the familiar polarization in perceptions of electoral integrity between win-
ners and losers. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
In contrast, the directionality hypothesis expects that value relevance and attitude involvement 
do not mitigate but exacerbate directional information processing: people who do care about 
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the electoral process diverge in their assessment of electoral integrity according to their politi-
cal preferences (+/-), while those who do not care are also not motivated to assess electoral 
integrity in line with their political preferences and hence converge in their perceptions (0). 
The following sections assess the empirical evidence. 
Data and methods 
Individual-level variables 
The dependent variable of interest is individual-level perceptions of electoral integrity (IPEI). 
We follow Norris (2014) in defining electoral integrity as internationally agreed-upon values, 
principles, and standards of the electoral cycle as a whole, including the campaign period, the 
election day itself, and its aftermath.2 Perceptions of electoral integrity, then, are the extent to 
which these standards are identified by different individuals as having been either met or vio-
lated. 
Our study uses the latest World Values Survey data (WVS, 2010–2014), which includes a bat-
tery of questions designed to measure IPEI at different stages in the electoral process. The 
disaggregated measure of IPEI allows for the development of a more reliable indicator than 
those based on a single item, as is the case in other comparative surveys. In addition, the diverse 
range of countries included in the WVS – from Algeria to the Netherlands to Uruguay – in-
creases the external validity of the findings.  
With regard to electoral integrity, respondents were asked “In your view, how often do the 
following things occur in the country’s elections?” 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of different approaches to the concept of electoral integrity, see Birch (2011). 
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a) Votes are counted fairly; 
b) Opposition candidates are prevented from running; 
c) TV news favours the governing party; 
d) Voters are bribed; 
e) Journalists provide fair coverage of elections; 
f) Election officials are fair; 
g) Rich people buy elections; 
h) Voters are threatened with violence at the polls; 
i) Voters are offered a genuine choice at the ballot box. 
Responses to each item were coded from “Very often” (1) to “Not at all often” (4).  
The nine items each show varying degrees of non-response. To minimize data loss and avoid 
introducing bias through listwise deletion (King, Honaker, Joseph & Scheve, 2001), we use 
propensity score matching to impute missing values (Austin, 2011; Bacher, 2002). A principal 
component analysis (PCA) shows that the items load on two different dimensions which we 
call, following Norris (2013a), electoral integrity (items a, e, f, and i) and electoral malpractice 
(items b, c, d, g, and h) (Table A1, online appendix).3 However, only the electoral integrity 
dimension is stable in all countries. We hence use only this dimension as dependent variable, 
combining the four items into an index. To do so, we first reverse the coding such that a higher 
                                                 
3 In addition to the empirical findings of the PCA, there are also theoretical reasons for distinguishing the two 
components: electoral integrity refers to the electoral process generally while not necessarily implying the inten-
tional intervention of (state) power. The items loading on electoral malpractice do, in contrast, all refer to inten-
tional use of financial, physical, or state power to influence elections. Variance in the presence of latter may also 
be the reason why the malpractice index varies across countries while the integrity index is stable. Note that this 
distinction parallels those by others in the study of electoral fairness. For example, Birch’s (2011) definition of 
electoral malpractice refers to “the manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes so as to substitute personal 
or partisan benefit for the public interest” only, that is, to intentional intervention. Elklit and Svensson (1997) 
distinguish between the fairness and freedom of elections, with electoral integrity mainly aligning with their di-
mension of fairness, while malpractice can be understood as a negation of the Freedom dimension.  
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number denotes a higher IPEI. We then weight each item by the component loadings derived 
from the PCA and build a summative index (see OECD, 2008). Like all following continuous 
measures, the index is then rescaled to range from 0 (here denoting low IPEI) to 1 (high IPEI).  
The two main independent variables are political party support and anti-authoritarian values. 
For party support, we code respondents as winners or losers according to whether they support 
the party or coalition of parties in power or those in the opposition, respectively, at the time of 
the survey.4  We use party position in power rather than the overall number of votes or seats 
gained because this indicator is more comparable across different electoral and government 
systems. Moreover, supporters of a party with the most votes but which remains in the opposi-
tion are, if anything, more likely to feel as losers of an election.  
Anti-authoritarian values are operationalized with the survey items from the WVS’ Democ-
racy–Autocracy Preference (DAP) scale (see Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), as they measure most 
closely respondents’ underlying democratic values per se and hence how involved they may be 
in evaluating the integrity of democratic processes.5 For each item in the scale, the survey asks: 
                                                 
4 For lack of a question on retrospective party support asking who the respondent voted for in the last election, we 
use the WVS prospective question V228, reading “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on 
this list would you vote?” The implication of the question wording for the analysis at hand is discussed in the 
conclusion. 
5 An alternative indicator, the assessment of “how democratically is your country being governed today” has been 
demonstrated to be a measure of support for the output of the democratic system rather than for its principles 
(Linde and Ekman, 2003). Another alternative indicator, respondents’ assessment of essential characteristics of 
democracy, neither gauges democratic values but rather knowledge or understanding of democratic processes (see 
Cho, 2014; Norris, 2011; Welzel & Moreno, 2014). For an analysis of the link between understanding of democ-
racy and electoral fairness, see Mattes, Mujani, Liddle, Shi & Chu (2015). A final alternative indicator which may 
be able to gauge the importance of electoral integrity to the respondent are the questions V228J and K on whether 
and to what extent the respondent thinks that “honest elections play an important role in deciding whether you 
and your family are able to make a good living” and “in whether or not this country develops economically”. 
While self-interest as presented by this instrumental perspective of democracy is also an indicator of attitude 
involvement according to Boninger et al. (1995), we would argue that the extrinsic motivation presented by ma-
terial factors does not provide as strong a basis for attitude involvement as the intrinsic motivation presented by 
democratic values. Moreover, the measurement is highly skewed as the vast majority of respondents indicate that 
honest elections are very important. Nevertheless, we conducted a robustness check with these items and found 
similar results to those presented here. 
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“I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as 
a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, 
fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?” 
a) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; 
b) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best 
for the country; 
c) Having the army rule; 
d) Having a democratic political system. 
Responses are coded from “very good” (1) to “very bad” (4). A PCA shows that items a–c fall 
into a consistent index (Table A2, online appendix). Our analysis is consistent with that by 
Ariely and Davidov (2011) who find that combining the four items into one model is not valid, 
and we hence drop the question on the democratic political system from further analysis. We 
invert the coding of the three remaining items to measure anti-authoritarian values, weight them 
by their component loadings, sum them to an index, and rescale them to lie between 0 and 1, 
with 0 denoting weak anti-authoritarian values (or support of authoritarian forms of govern-
ment) and 1 denoting strong anti-authoritarian values.  
We also include a number of controls for factors that should affect the relationship between 
party support, anti-authoritarian values, and perceptions of electoral integrity. The motivated 
reasoning-based perspective proposed above focuses on individuals’ information-processing 
abilities, suggesting that information consumption on political issues matters (see also Coffé, 
2016). Following either the accuracy or the directionality hypothesis, mediavores may have a 
more or less accurate IPEI: it may be more accurate because they are better informed, and it 
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may be less accurate because of biased information processing. Including media attention al-
lows to control for both possibilities when examining the convergence or divergence of IPEI 
between winners and losers. Respondents were asked how often they use daily newspapers, 
TV news, radio news, or the internet to obtain information about what is going on in the coun-
try. We aggregate all four items into an index of media attention, weighted by factor loadings 
from a factor analysis, and rescale it such that it ranges from 0 (no information source ever 
used) to 1 (all sources used on a daily basis). We complement the measure of media attention 
with one of political interest, a binary variable indicating whether respondents are not at all or 
not very interested in politics, as opposed to very or somewhat interested.6 
Perceptions of electoral integrity may be affected not only by indirect experiences of the elec-
toral process via the media but also by more direct experiences of malpractice during the elec-
tions (see also Kerr, 2013). To account for this we include two more items from the WVS 
electoral integrity battery: how often voters are bribed or threatened with violence at the polls. 
Since voters themselves are the objects of violations of electoral integrity, it is likely that their 
answer reflects their own experience or the observations of their local environment rather than 
just what is reported in the media. We include both items as dichotomous variables, with the 
conjoint of “not at all” and “not often” as reference category. 
Finally, we account for socio-demographic background. Klassen (2014) found that in general, 
older, male, and wealthier respondents are more likely to perceive elections to be honest than 
younger, female, and poorer respondents. The effect of education, in contrast, is more mixed: 
while in liberal democracies, better educated respondents are more likely to perceive elections 
                                                 
6 Using the original four-category coding does not alter the results. 
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to be honest, in less developed democracies they are more likely to perceive electoral malprac-
tice. We include all four socio-demographic variables in the analysis: age is included as log; 
gender is a binary variable with female as the base category; income is included as the income 
decile to which respondents allocate themselves; and education is a nine-category variable 
ranging from no formal education to university degree, here treated as continuous variable. 
Descriptive statistics for all individual-level variables are listed in Tables 1 and 2. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Context variables 
Beyond individual-level variables we also consider the country context, especially since the 
WVS includes a wide variety of countries. In addition to the level of socio-economic develop-
ment, the following country-level factors have been argued to affect the winner–loser gap in 
individual perceptions of electoral integrity: the actual level of electoral integrity, regime sta-
bility, proportionality of the electoral system, and freedom of the press (e.g. Anderson et al., 
2005; Birch, 2008; Coffé, 2016). Since a variance component analysis (VCA) of the country-
level variables shows that only electoral integrity, freedom of the press, and socio-economic 
development are significant indicators of IPEI, we limit our discussion to these variables here.7 
A measure of electoral integrity is provided by the Perception of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI; 
Norris, Martínez i Coma, Nai & Grömping, 2016). The PEI index is built upon a survey, ad-
ministered to country experts immediately following the national elections in the respective 
country. The experts are asked to evaluate the extent to which the different stages of the elec-
toral process meet international standards, including nearly identical questions to those asked 
                                                 
7 For the VCA, see Table A3, online appendix. 
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in the WVS. While, in contrast to the WVS, the expert survey refers to a specific election and 
in some countries has been conducted only after the WVS, it is a useful indicator of general 
electoral integrity in this paper: a comparison of the PEI index with other measures of electoral 
quality such as NELDA (National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy) and IEM (Index 
of Electoral Malpractice) shows strong positive correlations (Norris, 2013a). Moreover, as data 
collection for both the WVS and the PEI data occurred in roughly the same time period (2010–
2014 and 2012–2016, respectively) it is likely that both survey and expert respondents refer to 
the same events. We use the summary indicator “PEIIndexi”, rescaled to range from 0 to 1, 
with 1 denoting higher electoral integrity according to country experts.8 
Second, we include media freedom as a control variable at the country level. Countries with 
identical levels of electoral integrity but differing levels of media freedom should see differ-
ences in the perceptions of electoral integrity among citizens: citizens who are able to inform 
themselves about the conduct of the elections are more likely to know of violations of integrity 
than those in countries were the media is not free to report and any violations are covered up. 
We use the measure of access to unbiased media in the year 2012 as reported in the Varieties 
of Democracy dataset (variable “v2meaccess”; Coppedge et al., 2015) since this is the latest 
year for which data is available across the board and also the year in which the majority of 
elections and survey data collection took place. 
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                 
8 We use the summary indicator rather than only the items that were covered in the WVS electoral integrity index 
to account for the fact that the IPEI items refer to the country’s election in general while the PEI refers to a specific 
election in which the individual indicators may have diverged from the overall trend. The summary indicator is 
more likely to reflect the overall trend. This is supported by the index’s strong positive correlation with the other 
measures of electoral quality. Overall, however, the results are substantively similar no matter the PEI indicator 
used. 
15 
Finally, countries rated higher in socio-economic development tend to have a more strongly 
professionalized press and a higher percentage of the population who tunes into the news. We 
use the GDP per capita purchasing power provided in the PEI data, from the year of each re-
spective election. Like all other continuous measures, it was rescaled to lie between 0 (here 
low GDP) and 1 (high GDP). Table 3 presents descriptive data for the countries included in the 
analysis. Of all countries with data on IPEI in the WVS, we had to exclude Lebanon, Libya, 
and Singapore for lack of either individual- or country-level data, leaving us with 29 countries.9  
Analysis 
The interaction between party support and values  
We combine the individual- and country-level variables into multi-level linear regression mod-
els.10 Table 4 shows the results of two models, one with and one without the inclusion of anti-
authoritarian values and their interaction with political support. With two exceptions, both 
models provide very similar results. In both, income and education are not significant factors 
for individual perceptions of electoral integrity, but they show that older, female, better in-
formed, and politically interested respondents generally evaluate electoral integrity more pos-
itively than others do. Respondents who indicate that voters are often or very often bribed 
evaluate electoral integrity to be lower, while those who indicate that voters face violent threats, 
curiously, do the opposite. The main difference between the models is in the model fit Ω2: 
Model 0 without anti-authoritarian values fits the data slightly, but significantly (p<0.001), 
                                                 
9 Lebanon does not provide a winner–loser measure in the WVS; there is little cross-national data available for 
Singapore; and Libya is so far not covered in the PEI dataset. 
10 All data analysis is conducted using R (R Core Team, 2015). For the multilevel analyses we use the package 
lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). 
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worse than Model 1 with anti-authoritarian values, which suggests that perceptions of electoral 
integrity do indeed differ according to one’s values.   
[Table 4 about here] 
The effects of the main variables of interests – party support, anti-authoritarian values, and 
their interaction – cannot be deduced from the table (Brambor, Clark & Golder, 2006). Instead, 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the direction and size of the interaction effect for Model 1. Figure 3 
shows that the effect of anti-authoritarian values differs significantly between losers (0) and 
winners (1). For losers, the strength of anti-authoritarian values is significantly negatively re-
lated to IPEI: the stronger the respondents are opposed to authoritarian forms of government, 
the worse their evaluation of electoral integrity. For winners, in contrast, the relation is re-
versed: the stronger the respondents are opposed to authoritarian forms of government, the 
better their evaluation of electoral integrity. Figure 4 shows the estimated coefficient of win-
ning on IPEI depending on the strength of anti-authoritarian values: the stronger these values, 
the stronger the marginal effect of winning on individual perceptions of electoral integrity. At 
the high end of the scale, the effect of winning is at least almost twice (compare the inner 
confidence intervals at each extreme) and up to five times (compare the outer confidence in-
tervals at each extreme) as strong as among those supporting authoritarian forms of government 
at the low end of the scale. The bars show the existence of relatively large shares of respondents 
at each extreme.11 Overall, then, the figures demonstrate that anti-authoritarian commitment 
does not ensure a more even-handed evaluation of the actual situation; if that were the case, we 
                                                 
11 One may argue that anti-authoritarian values are not randomly distributed but clustered in certain regime types, 
such that the outcome may be driven by people in countries with very low levels of electoral integrity: if anti-
authoritarians win there, they are going to evaluate the elections very positively. In addition to including PEI in 
the multi-level models, we also ran a model without such electoral autocracies. The results are substantively the 
same as in the model including all countries.  
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would observe a convergence of perceptions on levels of electoral integrity among winners and 
losers towards the high end of the scale.  
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
Accuracy in perceptions of electoral integrity 
While these findings support the motivated reasoning perspective, they cannot yet adjudicate 
between “sore loser” explanations that see losers to be less accurate, an alternative “uncritical 
winners” explanation that sees winners to be less accurate, or the possibility that winners and 
losers have equally inaccurate perceptions of electoral integrity. Although such a question is 
difficult to answer with only cross-sectional data at hand, we may get first indications of who, 
on average, tends to be more accurate in their assessment of electoral integrity by looking at 
the available data from different perspectives. 
First, we can compare whether winners or losers align more closely with expert evaluations of 
electoral integrity. Recall our measure of the latter: evaluations of the electoral process elicited 
from country experts immediately following the elections. On average, country experts likely 
have a more informed and less biased view of electoral integrity than citizens. While expert 
survey data is far from perfect, a detailed analysis of the expert PEI dataset shows that, in 
contrast to the individual-level data, it is not plagued by systematic bias in evaluations of elec-
toral integrity (Martínez i Coma & van Ham, 2015). Moreover, as already mentioned, the ex-
pert measure correlates strongly with other measures of electoral quality. We therefore may 
use it as baseline against which to compare citizens’ perceptions.  
We repeat the above analyses for winners and losers separately, without the interaction, and 
compare models with and without the inclusion of the expert PEI index (Table 5). Where the 
included term improves the model fit, we may say that citizen views are similar to those of 
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experts and hence more likely to be accurate. Table 5 shows that, for winners, the addition of 
PEI does not improve model fit: the between-country variance of models 2 and 3 remains at 
the same level, confirmed by an ANOVA (p=0.418). That is, actual levels of electoral integrity 
do not affect winners’ evaluations. For losers, on the other hand, the addition of PEI in model 
5 reduces the between-country variance significantly, albeit on a low level (p=0.094). That is, 
if we hold experts’ PEI as an objective benchmark for electoral integrity, the results suggest 
that, overall, losers are more accurate in their perceptions of electoral integrity than winners.  
[Table 5 about here] 
A second way to attain an indication of accuracy is by comparing partisans to non-partisans. 
Beasley and Joslyn (2001) show that voters, as compared to non-voters, are more likely to 
change their attitudes following elections, which suggests that directional bias is indeed absent 
or at least significantly less pronounced among non-voters, and that they may hence serve as 
benchmark of perceived electoral integrity in society. We counted everyone as non-partisan, or 
undecided, who answered “don’t know” to the question of party support. Figures 5 and 6 pre-
sent the interaction effects for winners and losers as compared to undecided respondents. Fig-
ure 5 shows that the effect of anti-authoritarian values among winners differs substantially from 
that among the undecided, while the latter overlaps completely with the confidence intervals 
of the effect among losers. Figure 6 demonstrates accordingly that the effect of losing does not 
differ significantly from that of being undecided, no matter the strength of anti-authoritarian 
values: the confidence intervals enclose 0 for all values of anti-authoritarian values. Winning, 
in contrast, have a significantly positive effect on IPEI, and the effect increases the stronger 
the commitment to anti-authoritarian values. Together, assuming that undecided respondents 
and country experts are indeed less likely to be biased in their perceptions, both analyses sug-
gest to favour the “uncritical winner” hypothesis over the “sore loser” hypothesis with regard 
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to electoral integrity, with winners more likely to excuse – or less likely to notice – imperfec-
tions in the electoral process.  
[Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
Discussion and conclusion 
The legitimacy of the electoral process is crucial for the stability and consolidation of democ-
racy, yet to date few studies have examined the determinants of individual-level perceptions of 
electoral integrity in greater depth. This paper examined the interaction effect of political party 
support and anti-authoritarian values, hypothesizing that the latter should reduce the directional 
bias stemming from the former and hence increase accuracy. Using WVS data, we did find an 
interaction effect, but rather than a convergence among electoral winners and losers we found 
a polarization: among winners, one’s perceptions of electoral integrity increase the more one 
opposes authoritarian alternatives to democratic rule, while among losers, they decrease. Fur-
ther preliminary tests suggested that the interaction is mainly driven by overly positive percep-
tions of electoral integrity among winners.  
Linking the findings back to the theories of motivated reasoning, they suggest that the direc-
tional, prior-attitude effect of party support is not countered by a stronger commitment to the 
issue at stake and hence a stronger incentive to obtain information: instead of increasing accu-
racy, involvement increases the confirmation or disconfirmation bias in information pro-
cessing. This conclusion aligns with the findings by Taber and Lodge (2006) with regard to 
political sophistication: the authors found that, in experimental studies on the evaluation of 
political beliefs, attitude polarization is strongest among the political knowledgeable as they 
possess more information and a greater capacity to counter-argue disconfirming evidence.  
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One might argue that the relationship is indeed the other way around, with values and perceived 
electoral integrity influencing vote choice, rather than values and vote choice influencing per-
ceptions of electoral integrity. In the data at hand, the question on party support is prospective, 
not retrospective, asking who the respondent would support if there were elections tomorrow, 
and not who the respondent voted for in the last elections. Thus, alternatively to our argument, 
a voter who belonged to the electoral winners in the last election but who then came to the 
conclusion that the process was not fair and, due to her strong anti-authoritarian values, now 
opposes the government, would be wrongly counted in the loser camp. Conversely, a voter who 
belonged to the losers in the last elections but rated the process to be fair and therefore now 
supports the government would be wrongly counted in the winner camp. While we cannot 
completely rule out this possibility with the data at hand, it is rather unlikely.12 For it to hold, 
electoral support would need to be very fluid, yet the literature attests to the relative stability 
of party support (Schickler & Green, 1997). In particular, any change in vote choice is less 
likely to be affected by perceptions of electoral integrity rather than, say, more substantive 
disagreements with policy positions. Moreover, research has shown conceptual differences be-
tween assessment of specific governments and support for political institutions (Norris, 2011) 
and specifically confidence in the electoral process (Atkeson et al., 2015). Nevertheless, lon-
gitudinal approaches to examining the effect of campaigns and the aftermath of elections on 
procedural fairness are needed to provide clarification.  
While electoral processes may not always produce as clear-cut a winner–loser distinction as 
deployed here, election campaigns more or less by definition involve a degree of polarization. 
                                                 
12 As far as we know the question cannot be conclusively addressed with other cross-sectional data either: the 
prospective question is predominant in comparative survey research on perceptions of electoral integrity (e.g. 
Birch, 2008; Moehler, 2009; McAllister & White, 2015). We are aware of only single-country studies that use a 
retrospective question (e.g. Wolak, 2014; Cantú & García-Ponce, 2015; Cho & Kim, 2015). 
21 
If this polarization translates not only into differences in outcome satisfaction among winners 
and losers but also into differences in perceived procedural fairness, it may further undermine 
the legitimacy of the electoral process, and with that of democracy per se. This is underlined 
by findings in Tyler (2006) and Levi, Sacks & Taylor (2009), who link procedural fairness and 
political legitimacy in other institutional contexts, too. Gangl (2003) and Boda and Medve-
Bálint (2015) show that procedural fairness in fact outweighs government’s performance when 
it comes to determining institutional legitimacy. Increasing levels of perceived electoral integ-
rity and reducing the gap between electoral winners and losers is hence paramount, and by 
linking perceptions of electoral integrity in a cognitive-motivational model to prior attitudes 
and information-processing strategies, this paper suggests that reduced polarization in the elec-
tion campaign together with an increased transparency of the electoral process could help 
achieve this. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Competing hypotheses linking values to perceptions of electoral integrity 
 
 
  
Value relevance Attitude involvement 
Accuracy motivation 
Directional motivation 
Convergence on IPEI 
Divergence on IPEI 
? 
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Figure 2: Expected marginal effects of winning and losing on perceptions of electoral integrity 
Hypothesis sore losers accuracy directionality 
  anti-authoritarian authoritarian anti-authoritarian authoritarian 
Partisanship      
winners + 0 + + 0 
losers - 0 - - 0 
Note: The signs illustrate the expected marginal effects of winning or losing on individual-level perceptions of 
electoral integrity when looking at directional bias only (the sore loser hypothesis) and according to the accuracy 
and directionality hypotheses. A zero denotes that winners and losers should not differ significantly in their per-
ceptions of electoral integrity (convergence) while a plus and minus denote that there should be significant differ-
ences according to party support (divergence). 
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Figure 3: Effect of anti-authoritarian values on IPEI among losers and winners 
 
Notes: Dots represent the estimated coefficients of anti-authoritarian  
values β on IPEI among losers (0) and winners (1) in Model 1 (Table 4),  
while whiskers indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Figure produced  
with R package interplot (Solt & Hu, 2016). 
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Figure 4: Effect of winning on IPEI depending on anti-authoritarian values   
 
Notes: The line represents the estimated coefficient β of winning on IPEI for different  
levels of  anti-authoritarian values in Model 1 (Table 4), while the grey ribbons  
indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Bar height is proportional to the number of  
observations along the anti-authoritarian values spectrum. Figure produced with R  
package interplot (Solt & Hu, 2016). 
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Figure 5: Effect of anti-authoritarian values on IPEI among losers and winners, compared to 
undecideds 
 
Notes: Dots represent the estimated coefficients of anti-authoritarian values β on  
IPEI among undecideds (0), losers (1, left), and winners (1, right) for a model of IPEI  
as specified in Table 4 with Undecided as reference category in party support, while  
whiskers indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Figure produced with R package  
interplot (Solt & Hu, 2016). 
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Figure 6: Effect of losing and winning on IPEI depending on anti-authoritarian  
   values, compared to being undecided 
 
Notes: The line represents the estimated coefficient β of losing (left) and winning (right) on IPEI  
for different levels of anti-authoritarian values for a model of IPEI as specified in Table 4 with  
Undecided as reference category in party support, while the grey ribbons represent 95%-confidence  
intervals. Bar height is proportional to the number of observations along the anti-authoritarian  
values spectrum. Figure produced with R package interplot (Solt & Hu, 2016). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual-level continuous variables 
continuous variables valid obs. mean min max se 
IPEI 41395 0.60 0 1 0.001 
anti-authoritarian values 37999 0.54 0 1 0.001 
media attention 41008 0.63 0 1 0.001 
age 41213 41.69 18 98 0.082 
education 40898 5.64 1 9 0.011 
income 40684 4.79 1 10 0.011 
Note: Data from WVS (2016). Based on countries covered by both the IPEI battery in the WVS 
and the PEI dataset minus Singapore (n = 29 countries) and limited to respondents of voting age 
(21 years or older in Malaysia, 18 years or older everywhere else). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of individual-level categorical variables 
categorical variables valid obs. frequency proportion 
party support winner 34316 14481 0.42 
 loser  15771 0.46 
 undecided  4064 0.12 
interest not interested 41245 22736 0.55 
 
interested  18509 0.45 
bribes not (at all) often 41395 21039 0.51 
 (very) often  20356 0.49 
violence not (at all) often 41393 28730 0.69 
 (very) often  12663 0.31 
Note: Data from WVS (2016). Based on countries covered by both the IPEI bat-
tery in the WVS and the PEI dataset minus Singapore (n = 29 countries) and 
limited to respondents of voting age (21 years or older in Malaysia, 18 years or 
older everywhere else). 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of country-level variables 
country IPEI (mean) 
anti-authoritarian 
values (mean) PEI 
unbiased media access  
(share of population) 
GDP  
(pc ppp in US$) 
Algeria 0.50 0.69 0.58 0.38 5200 
Australia 0.76 0.71 0.77 0.95 50130 
Azerbaijan 0.52 0.61 0.36 0.23 6440 
Brazil 0.60 0.43 0.76 0.76 12020 
Chile 0.63 0.63 0.86 0.80 12350 
Colombia 0.49 0.49 0.74 0.48 7140 
Ecuador 0.59 0.52 0.68 0.58 4900 
Estonia 0.66 0.63 0.86 0.98 18390 
Georgia 0.51 0.61 0.72 0.76 3170 
Germany 0.89 0.70 0.89 0.98 46480 
Ghana 0.61 0.68 0.73 0.59 1260 
India 0.62 0.32 0.74 0.71 1500 
Kazakhstan 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.34 11705 
Kyrgyzstan 0.51 0.43 0.72 0.60 1220 
Malaysia 0.63 0.50 0.54 0.49 9080 
Mexico 0.58 0.46 0.73 0.48 9185 
Netherlands 0.73 0.66 0.87 0.96 53530 
Nigeria 0.53 0.50 0.71 0.55 2700 
Pakistan 0.52 0.45 0.66 0.74 1150 
Peru 0.47 0.50 0.69 0.60 6360 
37 
Philippines 0.62 0.49 0.63 0.80 3070 
Poland 0.68 0.57 0.82 0.96 13490 
Romania 0.52 0.39 0.64 0.82 8670 
South Africa 0.60 0.44 0.83 0.73 7640 
Taiwan 0.68 0.50 0.85 0.84 22294 
Thailand 0.66 0.62 0.58 0.86 5610 
Ukraine 0.48 0.51 0.63 0.74 3330 
Uruguay 0.67 0.64 0.89 0.92 13910 
Zimbabwe 0.51 0.65 0.53 0.48 690 
Notes: IPEI from World Values Survey (2016); PEI and GDP from Norris et al. (2016); media access from 
Coppedge et al. (2015). 
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Table 4: Multilevel linear regression results for IPEI 
   Model 0   Model 1 
β0 (Intercept) 0.37 ***  0.39 *** 
β1 income -0.00    -0.00   
β2 gender (female) 0.01 *  0.01 * 
β3 log(age) 0.03 ***  0.03 *** 
β4 education 0.00    0.00   
β5 media attention 0.05 ***  0.05 *** 
β6 interest (yes) 0.02 ***  0.02 *** 
β7 bribes (often) -0.04 ***  -0.04 *** 
β8 threats (often) 0.01 **  0.01 ** 
β9 party support (winner) 0.06 ***  0.03 *** 
 party support (undecided) 0.01    0.00   
β10 anti-authoritarian values   -0.04 *** 
β11 media access 0.13    0.13 
β12 GDP pc ppp 0.17**    0.18 ** 
β13 PEI 0.07  0.07 
β14 winner x anti-authoritarian values   0.06*** 
 undecided x anti-authoritarian values      0.01 
39 
σ2 0.042  0.042 
τ00,countries 0.003  0.003 
Ncountries 29  29 
ICCcountries 0.058  0.059 
Observations 27403  27403 
Ω2 .210  .211 
Notes: * p<.05   ** p<.01   *** p<.001. Table produced with R package sjPlot (Lü-
decke, 2016). Model 0 is the same as Model 1, excluding anti-authoritarian values. 
Model 1: 
IPEIij = β0 + β1incomeij + β2genderij + β3log(ageij) + β4educationij +  
    β5mediaattentionij + β6interestij + β7bribesij + β8threatsij + 
            β9winnerij + β10anti-authoritarianvaluesij + β11mediaaccessj +  
            β12GDPj + β13PEIj + β14(partysupportij x anti-authoritarianvaluesij) + uj + eij 
βn are the regression coefficients, uj is the effect of country j, and eij is the residual varia-
tion of individual i in country j.  Difference in model fit is significant at p<0.001. 
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Table 5: Multilevel linear regression results for IPEI among winners and losers separately 
   winners  losers 
   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
β0 (Intercept)   0.42 ***   0.46 ***   0.31 ***   0.23 ** 
β1 income   0.00     0.00     -0.01     -0.01   
β2 gender (female)   -0.00     -0.00     0.01 *   0.01 * 
β3 log(age)   0.04 ***   0.04 ***   0.01     0.01   
β4 education   0.01     0.01     0.00     0.00   
β5 media attention   0.06 ***   0.06 ***   0.06 ***   0.06 *** 
β6 interest (yes)   0.03 ***   0.03 ***   0.01 **   0.01 ** 
β7 bribes (often)   -0.02 ***   -0.02 ***   -0.04 ***   -0.04 *** 
β8 threats (often)   0.02 ***   0.02 ***   0.01     0.01 * 
β9 anti-authoritarian values   0.00     0.00     -0.03 ***   -0.03 *** 
β10 media access   0.16 *   0.22 *   0.30 ***   0.19   
β11 GDP pc ppp   0.16 **   0.18 **   0.16 **   0.12 * 
β12 PEI   
 
  -0.13           0.28   
σ2   0.041 
 
0.041 
 
0.041 
 
0.041 
τ00,countries  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.004 
Ncountries   29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
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ICCcountries   0.079 
 
0.077 
 
0.091 
 
0.083 
Observations   13195 
 
13195 
 
14208 
 
14208 
Ω2  .185  .185  .252  .252 
Notes: * p<.05   ** p<.01   *** p<.001. Table produced with R package sjPlot (Lüdecke, 2016). 
Models 2 and 3 estimate IPEIij for electoral winners only, models 4 and 5 for electoral losers only.  
IPEIij = β0 + β1incomeij + β2genderij + β3log(ageij) + β4educationij + β5mediaattentionij + β6interestij + β7bribesij + 
β8threatsij +  β9anti-authoritarianvaluesij + β10mediaaccessj + β11GDPj + β12PEIj + uj + eij. 
βn are the regression coefficients, uj is the effect of country j, and eij is the residual variation of individual i in 
country j.  Blank cells indicate that the parameter is not included in the model. Significance of difference in model 
fit between models 2 and 3: p=0.418, between models 4 and 5: p=0.094. 
 
  
42 
Online Appendix 
Table A1: Principal Component Analysis loadings  
 
    Component 
    1 2 
Electoral malpractice Voters are bribed  .776 -.114 
Rich people buy elections  .745 -.120 
Voters are threatened with violence at the polls  .691 -.074 
TV news favours the governing party  .605  .041 
Opposition candidates are prevented from running  .605 -.021 
Electoral integrity  Journalists provide fair coverage of elections  .098  .668 
 
 Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections  .023  .662 
 
 Election officials are fair -.165  .769 
 
 Votes are counted fairly -.242  .685 
Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: .772. 
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Table A2: Principal Component Analysis loadings  
 
 1 
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections  .757 
Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the  country  .752 
Having the army rule  .684 
Having a democratic system -.062 
Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.612. 
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Variance Component Analysis 
In addition to the country-level measures perceptions of electoral integrity (PEI), access to 
unbiased media, and GDP per capita, we tested the effect of two further factors: regime stability 
(captured by the variable “durable” from the Polity 2 data, also available in the PEI dataset) as 
well as disproportionality of the electoral system (captured by the Gallagher Index of Dispro-
portionality, indicating the difference between the percentage of votes and the percentage of 
parliamentary seats received; see Gallagher, 1991).13  
We examined whether all context variables are informative for individual perceptions of elec-
toral integrity by comparing the unexplained between-country variances between multi-level 
models without and with the separate country-level variables. Table A3 shows that only media 
access, PEI, and GDP contribute significantly to the reduction of between-country variance in 
IPEI, both individually and taken together. Regime stability and the degree of disproportional-
ity, in contrast, do not add significantly to the explanation and were hence excluded from the 
analyses.14 
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Table A3: Explanatory power of country-level variables 
context variable(s) ơj2 p 
(none) 0.008  
PEI 0.004 < 0.001 
media access 0.004 < 0.001 
GDP 0.003 < 0.001 
regime stability 0.006    0.022 
GID 0.007    0.426 
PEI, GDP, media access 0.002 < 0.001 
PEI, GDP, media access, regime stability 0.002 < 0.001 
Notes:  
ơj2 = between-country variance of individual-level model with con-
textual effects added individually, e.g.: 
IPEIij = β0 + β1incomeij + β2genderij + β3log(ageij) + β4educa-
tionij + β5mediaattentionij + β6interestij + β7bribesij + β8threatsij 
+ β9winnerij + β10anti-authoritarianvaluesij + β11(winnerij x 
anti-authoritarianvaluesij) + β12PEIj + uj + eij 
p = Significance of difference between ơj2 of the models with con-
textual effects and the one without, according to an ANOVA test. 
 
 
 
